Himmelfarb Health Sciences Library, The George Washington University

Health Sciences Research Commons
Geiger Gibson/RCHN Community Health
Foundation Research Collaborative

Health Policy and Management

10-11-2016

Community Health Centers and Medicaid
Payment Reform: Emerging Lessons from
Medicaid Expansion States
Peter Shin
George Washington University

Jessica Sharac
George Washington University

Zoe Barber
George Washington University

Sara J. Rosenbaum
George Washington University

Follow this and additional works at: http://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/sphhs_policy_ggrchn
Part of the Community Health and Preventive Medicine Commons, Health Law and Policy
Commons, and the Health Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Shin, Peter; Sharac, Jessica; Barber, Zoe; and Rosenbaum, Sara J., "Community Health Centers and Medicaid Payment Reform:
Emerging Lessons from Medicaid Expansion States" (2016). Geiger Gibson/RCHN Community Health Foundation Research
Collaborative. Paper 55.
http://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/sphhs_policy_ggrchn/55

This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Health Policy and Management at Health Sciences Research Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Geiger Gibson/RCHN Community Health Foundation Research Collaborative by an authorized administrator of
Health Sciences Research Commons. For more information, please contact hsrc@gwu.edu.

Geiger Gibson Program in
Community Health Policy

Geiger Gibson RCHN Community Health Foundation
Issue Brief #45

Community Health Centers and Medicaid Payment Reform:
Emerging Lessons from Medicaid Expansion States
Peter Shin, PhD, MPH
Jessica Sharac, MSc, MPH
Zoe Barber, MPH*
Sara Rosenbaum, JD

October 11, 2016

Supported by a generous grant from the Commonwealth Fund.

* Zoe Barber was a Research Assistant in the Department of Health Policy and
Management at the time of the study. She is currently a Public Health Analyst in the
Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology.
1

Geiger Gibson Program in
Community Health Policy

About the Geiger Gibson / RCHN Community Health Foundation Research
Collaborative
The Geiger Gibson Program in Community Health Policy, established in 2003 and
named after human rights and health center pioneers Drs. H. Jack Geiger and Count
Gibson, is part of the Milken Institute School of Public Health at The George
Washington University. It focuses on the history and contributions of health centers and
the major policy issues that affect health centers, their communities, and the patients
that they serve.
The RCHN Community Health Foundation is a not-for-profit foundation established to
support community health centers through strategic investment, outreach, education,
and cutting-edge health policy research. The only foundation in the U.S. dedicated
solely to community health centers, RCHN CHF builds on a long-standing commitment
to providing accessible, high-quality, community-based healthcare services for
underserved and medically vulnerable populations. The Foundation’s gift to the Geiger
Gibson program supports health center research and scholarship.
Additional information about the Research Collaborative can be found online at
http://publichealth.gwu.edu/projects/geiger-gibson-program-community-health-policy or
at rchnfoundation.org.
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Executive Summary
Community health centers represent a major source of primary health care for the
nation’s Medicaid beneficiaries. Because the Federally Qualified Health Center (FQHC)
payment system is encounter-based, health centers and Medicaid agencies in ACA
expansion states are actively pursuing payment reforms that will enable health centers
to adopt strategies that can more effectively respond to the considerable and complex
health and social needs of people served by health centers, and more efficiently
address the surging volume of patient care. In five expansion states whose alternative
payment experiments are underway, health centers and Medicaid agencies are testing
payment alternatives, such as global payments, that link payment to performance while
ensuring that the FQHC hold-harmless standard is met and that total revenues do not
fall below the FQHC floor. These alternative payment approaches enable health centers
to test new strategies to address the needs of their patients, while enabling state
agencies to align these strategies more closely with broader payment reform efforts.
Introduction
Community health centers play a critical role as Medicaid providers, serving one in five
Medicaid beneficiaries nationally in 2015.1 In order to ensure that health center grants
remain used for uninsured populations and services, federal Medicaid law establishes
“federally qualified health center (FQHC)” payment rules. These rules established a
payment floor on the amount health centers receive for the covered services they
provide to Medicaid beneficiaries. This analysis examines how health centers and state
Medicaid programs in a number of Medicaid expansion states are working to restructure
Medicaid’s longstanding FQHC payment system in order to promote efficiency and
quality, and more actively integrate health centers into states’ broader payment reform
efforts.
Background
As the nation’s largest single source of primary care for medically underserved
communities and populations, community health centers play a key role in the health
care system for both Medicaid-insured and uninsured populations. In 2015, 1,375 health
1

Based on 11.9 million Medicaid patients served by health centers in 2015 and 58.2 million Medicaid enrollees in
December 2015. Bureau of Primary Health Care. (2016). 2015 Health Center Data: National Data. Health Resources
and Services Administration. http://bphc.hrsa.gov/uds/datacenter.aspx?q=tall&year=2015&state=&fd=; Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). (2016). Total Medicaid Enrollees ‐ VIII Group Break Out Report.
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/program-information/downloads/cms-64enrollment-report-oct-dec-2015.pdf
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centers operating in 9,754 sites served 24.3 million patients, 49 percent of whom were
insured by Medicaid.2 As sources of comprehensive primary health care, health centers
are integral to the operation of managed care systems, which serve three in four
Medicaid beneficiaries.3 Given the extent of poverty among health center patients, 71
percent of whom have incomes at or below the federal poverty level, Medicaid
represents the single largest source of insurance coverage at health centers. In states
that expanded Medicaid through the Affordable Care Act, 55 percent of health center
patients were enrolled in Medicaid in 2015, but Medicaid accounted for only 34 percent
of health center patients in states that did not expand Medicaid.4
Research has documented the value of health centers as sources of primary health
care.5 Research examining 2009 Medicaid claims data from 13 states showed that nonelderly adult Medicaid enrollees who received more than half of their primary care visits
at health centers had lower utilization and spending across all measured services
(primary care, other outpatient care, prescription drug spending, emergency department
services, and inpatient care); total spending was 24% lower compared to those who
received most of their primary care from non-health center providers. Although the
study predates the ACA, the multi-state findings underscore their potential to create
value for Medicaid programs.
Beyond serving Medicaid patients, health centers also are a principal source of care for
uninsured patients; in 2015, 24 percent of patients served by health centers were
uninsured (Figure 1). In addition, health centers provide a range of services for which
most patients, including those who are insured, lack coverage, such as adult dental
care, care management, patient transportation, and translation services. Federal grants
are the principal source of funding for these uninsured services and populations. Grants
are also the means by which health centers absorb uncompensated care costs for
patients with incomes low enough to qualify for sliding fee assistance, including those
with Marketplace coverage carrying substantial deductibles and cost-sharing.6

2

Bureau of Primary Health Care. (2016). 2015 Health Center Data: National Data. Health Resources and Services
Administration. http://bphc.hrsa.gov/uds/datacenter.aspx?q=tall&year=2015&state=&fd=
3
Kaiser State Health Facts. (2016). Total Medicaid Managed Care Enrollment. http://kff.org/medicaid/stateindicator/total-medicaid-mc-enrollment/
4
GW analysis of 2015 Uniform Data System (UDS) data
5
Nocon, R. S., Lee, S. M., Sharma, R., Ngo-Metzger, Q., Mukamel, D. B., Gao, Y., ... & Huang, E. S. (2016). Health
care use and spending for Medicaid enrollees in Federally Qualified Health Centers versus other primary care
settings. American Journal of Public Health: e1–e9. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2016.303341
6
Gunja, M. Z., Collins, S. R., Doty, M. M., & Beutel, S. (2016). Americans' Experiences with ACA Marketplace
Coverage: Affordability and Provider Network Satisfaction: Findings from the Commonwealth Fund Affordable Care
Act Tracking Survey, February--April 2016. The Commonwealth Fund.
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Figure 1: Community Health Center Patients by Insurance Type, 2015

Federal Medicaid law requires states to use a special “federally qualified health center
(FQHC)” method when paying health centers. (This method also applies to Medicare,
the Children’s Health Insurance Program, and health plans governed by the ACA’s
“essential health benefit” coverage rules). The FQHC payment requirement is designed
to better align Medicaid revenues received with the proportion of Medicaid-insured
patients served in order to conserve federal grants for uninsured (or under-insured)
patients and services. To a significant degree, the methodology has achieved this
result; in 2015, the two numbers were close to parity: 49 percent of health center
patients received Medicaid, and Medicaid represented 44 percent of health center
revenues.
The FQHC payment method, known as the “prospective payment system (PPS),” pegs
health center payments to the cost of providing covered services to Medicaid patients.
In keeping with traditional fee-for-service care, payments are bundled into an allinclusive encounter rate, and health center physicians, dentists (to the extent that oral
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2016/jul/affordability-and-network-satisfaction ;
Rae, M., Claxton, G., Cox, C., Long, M., & Damico, A. (2016). Cost-Sharing Subsidies in Federal Marketplace Plans,
2016. Kaiser Family Foundation. http://kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/cost-sharing-subsidies-in-federalmarketplace-plans-2016/
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health care is covered), psychologists, and allied health care professionals, such as
nurse practitioners and physician assistants, bill for the services they furnish. States
may include in calculating the encounter rate the services of other health professionals,
such as health educators, dieticians, and care managers, although many may elect not
to do so, and in setting the rate, states can impose upper payment limits. In the case of
health centers that participate in managed care plans (in 2015, 28 percent report
participation in capitated Medicaid managed care plans), managed care plans may
administer PPS on behalf of a state, and are paid additional funds beyond the
managed care capitation rate to do so. In other cases, the state agency may administer
the PPS rate directly, reconciling health centers’ provider network payments against
what they would be owed under the PPS rate.
The PPS payment system thus sets a federal floor approximating the cost of treating
Medicaid patients. However, federal law also permits states and health centers to
negotiate an alternative payment methodology (APM) that permits health centers to test
alternative payment approaches, such as global payments, that do not depend on
encounter-based billing and therefore offer health centers greater flexibility in how their
clinical staff furnish care. Reflecting the core PPS requirement to align Medicaid
revenues with the cost of covered services, federal law requires that APM approaches
produce the same amount of revenue in relation to patients served that the basic PPS
encounter-based system would produce.7 As long as they meet this requirement, health
centers are able to move away from encounter billing, and states are able to introduce
value-based payment principles such as an emphasis on efficiencies that can reduce
the volume of encounters over time, as well as shared savings for quality performance.
The question is how this PPS flexibility is being used to modernize the FQHC payment
structure and move health centers away from older approaches tied to the volume of
encounters.
Methodology
Our analysis of efforts to develop alternative payment systems focused on states that
have expanded Medicaid and that, along with health centers, are faced with managing a
major surge in the volume of needed care. In consultation with Medicaid payment
experts and Medicaid agencies in expansion states during the winter and spring of
2015, we identified four states that were in the process of implementing payment
reform, and three that already had begun to implement reforms. Among these states,
7

CMS. (February 10, 2010. State Health Official Letter RE: Prospective Payment System for FQHCs and RHCs.
https://www.medicaid.gov/Federal-Policy-Guidance/downloads/SHO10004.pdf
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we determined that five states (California, Colorado, Minnesota, New York, and Oregon)
were far enough along to merit in-depth interviews. (As of 2016, Washington State’s
health centers and Medicaid program also appear to be extensively engaged in
alternative payment negotiations). In the five states identified in 2015, we interviewed
both state Medicaid agency and health center staff, including the staff of state primary
care associations that negotiate on behalf of their state’s health centers.
Results
Medicaid expansion and a decline in uninsured patients created the context for
alternative payment negotiations.
The health centers located in the five study states represent 22 percent of all health
centers nationally, 29 percent of patients, and 35 percent of all Medicaid patients served
by health centers in 2015. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of health centers in
the five in-depth study states. It shows that despite Medicaid expansion and a major
decline in uninsured patients, all health centers continued to serve a significant
proportion of patients who remained uninsured. In 2015, approximately one in five
health center patients were uninsured in each study state.
Table 1: Total health center patients and changes in insurance coverage in the
five study states, 2013-2015
California Colorado
Minnesota
Number of Patients and Insurance Coverage in 2015
Total patients
4,065,289
553,807
173,571
Percentage of
63%
57%
47%
Medicaid-insured
patients
Percentage of
22%
22%
29%
uninsured patients
Changes from 2013 to 2015
Percentage
19%
11%
-1%
change in the
number of total
patients
Percentage
60%
50%
21%
change in the

New York

Oregon

1,907,971
55%

369,933
60%

17%

19%

13%

14%

26%

58%
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number of
Medicaid patients
Percentage
change in the
number of
uninsured patients
Difference in
percentage of
Medicaid patients
Difference in
percentage of
uninsured patients

California

Colorado

Minnesota

New York

Oregon

-31%

-34%

-23%

-14%

-40%

16%

15%

8%

6%

17%

-16%

-15%

-9%

-5%

-17%

Health center payment reform is part of a broader delivery reform effort in which
health centers were actively involved.
In the five states, health centers were actively engaged in their state’s broader efforts to
modernize Medicaid payment structures as an integral part of expansion. All five states
placed an emphasis on delivery reforms capable of more effectively managing complex
patients, achieving stronger performance outcomes, and improving efficiency. In one
state – Minnesota – health centers actually lead one of the new delivery system models
(known as the Federally Qualified Health Center Urban Health Network [FUHN]). 8 In
other states, health center pilot payment reforms are occurring within larger delivery
system changes. In all states, health centers anticipated playing a role as part of
broader managed care initiatives or integrated delivery system formation. Those
interviewed in all states recognized the importance of participating in these larger and
more integrated efforts to improve quality while achieving more sustainable Medicaid
spending growth.
Payment reform negotiations included alternative payment structures, quality and
performance improvement, and the use of alternative payment as a means for
limiting risk.
8

Schoenherr, K. E., Van Citters, A. D., Carluzzo, K. L., Bergquist, S., Fisher, E. S., & Lewis, V. A. (2013). Establishing a
coalition to pursue accountable care in the safety net: a case study of the FQHC Urban Health Network. The
Commonwealth Fund. Publication No. 1710, Volume 28.
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Case%20Study/2013/Oct/1710_Schoenherr_FQH
C_case%20study_v2.pdf
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Table A1 (Appendix) summarizes the key elements of the payment reform approaches
in the five study states. In all five states, the alternative payment method seeks to
combine efficiency and quality improvement goals with the need to ensure that the total
amount of payment does not fall below the FQHC PPS encounter-based payment floor.
Payment thus remains subject to reconciliation, but payments themselves may be made
on a global basis that enables health centers to test service delivery innovations no
longer driven by the need to generate physician encounters in order to secure payment.
Payment reform in California was the product of state legislation establishing health
center payment reform pilots. 9 In Minnesota, Colorado, New York, and Oregon, by
contrast, health center payment reform was an outgrowth of each state’s broader effort
at payment reform, typically the result of delivery system reform efforts conducted under
Section 1115 of the Social Security Act.
But while the PPS system effectively establishes a hold-harmless revenue floor,
state/health center negotiations have reflected different approaches to alternative
payment methods. The most common alternative approach was a per-member-permonth payment structure for patients receiving their care at a health center included in
the payment reform pilot (California, Colorado and Oregon); these alternatives may
allow health centers to report fewer face-to-face encounters, while at the same time
emphasizing more frequent patient “touches” through expanded use of telephone and
texting. Minnesota retained an encounter-based approach in its FUHN network. New
York’s value based payment reform, a product of negotiations between hospital-led
delivery systems and health centers, was under development at the time of our
interviews.
In interviews, health center staff voiced specific strategic interest in payment reform.
Several expressed a desire to substitute community health workers and for more highly
trained and licensed clinical staff in order to reduce clinician burden, and identified a
need for more efficient care models targeting specific health conditions to reduce the
need for a high volume of face-to-face encounters. Payment reform thus has emerged
as a crucial workforce and care redesign strategy and is viewed as a means for
promoting recruitment and retention. Given the constant, significant challenge of

9

Payment Reform Pilot Program for Federally Qualified Health Centers. (2015-2016). (Article 4.1, Section 14138.1).
SB-147, California Legislature. http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB147.
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recruiting primary care clinicians to work in medically underserved communities, 10
health center respondents were eager for strategies that would enable them to maintain
needed operating revenue while nonetheless identifying approaches that could lower
the pressure to treat high numbers of patients through the face-to-face encounter
system that lies at the heart of the PPS payment methodology as originally enacted.
The question of how to reconcile alternative payment structures with the PPS payment
floor emerged as a central one. As Table A1 shows, the state approaches vary. In three
states (Oregon, Colorado, and Minnesota), the state Medicaid agency retained
responsibility for reconciling revenues against the PPS risk corridor. Health plans in
California’s pilot alternative payment program were to assume reconciliation
responsibility, while in New York, it appeared that the state would continue to play this
role.
Where PPS payment reconciliation was concerned, Oregon appears to be the most
interesting example. In that state, negotiations have focused not only on supplemental
payments per encounter, but also at an aggregate level. That is, the reconciliation
negotiations reflect the hold-harmless requirement of the PPS revenue floor, and have
focused on how to ensure that health centers could maintain the overall revenue flow
needed to make the workforce and capital improvement investments necessary to
achieving change.
In terms of clinical services contained within the alternative payment structure, no two
states have taken the same approach. In some states services such as adult oral
health, behavioral health, vision care, and enabling services are included in the
methodology. In others, the negotiations omit one or more of these services. Pharmacy
services remain outside capitation structures.
Quality measurement is an express feature of three models (Colorado, Minnesota, and
Oregon); by contrast, the New York approach assumes that as network participants,
health centers will be accountable for attaining the broader quality improvement goals
used by its system-wide delivery transformation models. Performance is measured for a
range of outcomes including reduced use of diagnostic services, reduction in inpatient
and emergency care, improvements in the primary care management of chronic

10

National Association of Community Health Centers. (2016). Staffing the Safety Net: Building the Primary Care
Workforce at America’s Health Centers. http://nachc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/10/NACHC_Workforce_Report_2016.pdf
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conditions such as depression, diabetes, vascular disease, and patient satisfaction and
communication.
As a result of their involvement in “Patient-Centered Medical Homes”11 initiatives, as
well as higher rates of adoption of electronic health records (68 percent of health
centers had recognition as Patient-Centered Medical Homes and 98 percent reported
using electronic health records in 2015),12 respondents report that health centers had
the knowledge and experience to participate in broader quality improvement incentives
or performance-based payment efforts. Several respondents also noted, however, that
the ability to reliably collect and report on data tying performance to payment would
continue to require ongoing investment in health information systems that could be
aligned not only with the delivery systems of which they were a part but also with their
states’ information needs. All respondents reported interest in shared savings
approaches that reward health centers for quality improvement. Minnesota and
Colorado both had adopted a shared savings program at the time of our interviews;
Minnesota’s rewarded positive performance and state officials noted that they were
considering penalties for sub-par performance in the future.
Conclusion
This analysis, which took place at a relatively early stage in the alternative payment
negotiation process, shows that health center payment reform is under way in Medicaid
expansion states, in which surging Medicaid enrollment sets the stage for expanded
interest in innovations to control spending growth. Expansion states are eager to
incorporate health centers into broader payment reform efforts. For their part, health
centers are eager for approaches that manage growth and that enable them to test
alternative service delivery models that mitigate unmanageable pressures on clinical
and support staff and enhance their ability to recruit new staff. Both sides have much to
gain from payment reform. In these states, PPS remains the payment floor and
operates as a hold-harmless strategy for ensuring that Medicaid revenues continue to
approximate the cost of caring for Medicaid patients. Given the continuing need for care

11

Ku L., Shin P., Jones E., & Bruen, B. (2011). Transforming Community Health Centers into Patient-Centered
Medical Homes: The Role of Payment Reform. The Commonwealth Fund.
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund-reports/2011/sep/transforming-community-healthcenters
12
Bureau of Primary Health Care, Health Resources and Services Administration. (2016). National 2015 Health
Center Data. Electronic Health Record (EHR) Information.
http://bphc.hrsa.gov/uds/datacenter.aspx?q=tehr&year=2015&state=

11

Geiger Gibson Program in
Community Health Policy

among uninsured and under-insured patients, maintaining health center capacity to
meet their federal obligations has emerged as an important consideration in all states.
Alternative payment models can be tied to case payment rates and global payment
methods, as can shared savings for performance improvement. Payment reform
strategies can be carried out as an integral part of broader health system reform, with
states either retaining direct responsibility for negotiating the terms of reform models or
taking on an oversight role in the health plan reconciliation process.
Several considerations appear to be important. First, Medicaid expansion and larger
delivery system reform considerations appear to create the context for health center
payment reform. Both larger-scale reforms set the stage for greater health center
involvement in efforts that can maximize the stability and efficiency of large-scale
insurance reform. Second, direct negotiations between health centers and state
agencies are important, since moving to an alternative payment method is envisioned
under the PPS law governing FQHC payments as the product of a negotiated
alternative.
Third, the negotiation process touches on a variety of fundamentals: (1) a move away
from volume in favor of alternative means for delivering necessary health care; (2) a
reconciliation process that limits losses to levels permitted under PPS; (3) voluntary
health center participation; and (4) quality metrics that reflect either the broader metrics
used in delivery reform or in some cases, metrics tied explicitly to the alternative
payment methodology.
The process of health center payment reform is challenging, just as it is for provider
payment reform generally. The federal government might promote further advances in
Medicaid expansion states through the development of alternative FQHC payment
models that can test payment reform. These models can be coupled with information
sharing to allow the more rapid spread of reform innovations such as the introduction of
global payments coupled with strategies for ensuring that overall revenues remain
adequate for robust health center operations and growth. In this respect, efforts in
recent years by CMS to accelerate large-scale Medicaid reform might be extended to
include the creation of alternative FQHC payment systems that can, in turn, encourage
greater health center integration into payment transformation efforts.
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Appendix
Table A1: Study State Alternative Payment Models
State

General description

Health center
participation

Alternative
payment
method: general
approach

PPS payment
reconciliation

Financial risk
mitigation under
base payment
method

Quality
improvement

Governance

California

A 3-year, 18-county
alternative payment model
pilot project authorized by
state law as part of
broader health system
transformation. Pilot
begins July 201613 and is
designed to test a permember-per-month
capitation payment
method. Participation by
about 80 health centers is
anticipated.

Health centers
can elect
participation;
health plans in
pilot counties
required to
participate with
health centers
desiring to do so.

Per-member-permonth payment
for prospectively
assigned
patients.

A supplemental
payment
(known as a
wrap cap) to be
carried out by
health plans in
accordance
with state
policies

Risk-adjusted
payments
reflecting both
patient
characteristics
and, eventually,
utilization trends.

No specific
performance
metrics beyond
those used by
health plans.

No formal
governance
structure;
health centers
can elect to
participate.14

Colorado

Part of the state’s
Accountable Care
Collaborative (ACC) carried
out through Regional Care
Collaboratives (RCCOs),

Voluntary
participation as
part of CCO
system, with
strong

Per member per
month payment
for patients using
a health center
as a medical

A supplemental
payment
administered
by health

The per-memberper month
payment
methodology
excludes high

Both overall RCCO
and health center
specific metrics

Tied to health
center
participation in
RCCO

RCCOs:

13

Payment Reform Pilot Program for Federally Qualified Health Centers. (2015-2016). ( Article 4.1, Section 14138.1). SB-147, California Legislature.
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB147.
14
Personal communication, California Primary Care Association. May 4, 2015.
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State

General description

Health center
participation

which combine clinical
encouragement.
integration and payment
reform.15 The PRIME Rocky
Mountain Health Plan
regional collaborative is
designed to test an
alternative payment model
under a two-year pilot.16

Alternative
payment
method: general
approach

PPS payment
reconciliation

Financial risk
mitigation under
base payment
method

Quality
improvement

Governance

home,
supplemented by
an additional
per-member-permonth case
management
payment and for
satisfying
performance
targets.

plans.

need
beneficiaries who
are elderly or
persons with
disabilities.

1) Reduction in
high cost
imaging
2) Reduction in 30day all cause
hospital
readmission
3) Reduction in ER
visits
4) Increase in well
child visits
Health center
APM:17
1) Adult body mass
index
2) Anti-depressant
Medication
Management
3) Comprehensive
diabetes care
4) Patient
engagement
(Patient Activation
Measure (PAM))

governance.18

15

http://www.medicaid.gov/State-resource-center/Medicaid-State-Plan-Amendments/Downloads/CO/CO-13-003-Att.pdf
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/hcpf/accountable-care-collaborative-payment-reform-initiative-hb12-1281
17
Rocky Mountain Health Plans. Medicaid PRIME https://www.rmhpcommunity.org/content/medicaid-prime
18
Personal communication, Colorado Primary Care Association.
16

14

State

General description

Minnesota Part of the state’s
Integrated Health
Partnership (IHP)
accountable care
initiative.19 One member is
a health center-led
Federally Qualified Health
Center Urban Health
Network (FUHN),20
consisting of 10 health
centers operating in 40
sites across the
Minneapolis/St. Paul area.

Health center
participation

Health centers
within the FUHN
service area elect
to participate.

Alternative
payment
method: general
approach

Health centers
continue to be
paid on an
encounter basis
for patients
attributed to the
health center,
with eligibility for
shared savings
payments.

PPS payment
reconciliation

Retained by
the state

Financial risk
mitigation under
base payment
method

Quality
improvement

Governance

that measures selfmanagement
ability.
A cost-related
1) Improved
Health centers
encounter rate is
management of
govern the
maintained, with
depression to
FUHN.
incentives limited
reduce remission
to shared savings
at six months
from quality
2) optimal diabetes
care
performance.
3) optimal vascular
care
4) optimal asthma
care for children
and adults
5) patient ratings of
providers
6) provider
communication
with patients
7) office staff

19

https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=256B.0755#stat.256B.0755.1.
Fournier, J. & Schwartz, P. (Oct 2014). The FQHC Urban Health Network’s (FUHN) Integrated Health Partnership Demonstration Project. Presentation at
Academy Health conference: Payment Reform: Honing the Models and Pushing the Boundaries.
http://www.academyhealth.org/files/HCFO/Fournier%26Schwartz%20-%20Honing%20the%20Model%20Presentation%2010%202014%20%20FUHN%20Overview.pdf.
20
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State

General description

New York

Part of the state’s §1115
Medicaid Delivery System
Incentive Reform Payment
(DSRIP) demonstration.21
Health centers
participating in DSRIPcreated Performing
Provider Systems (PPS).
Most PPS entities are

Health center
participation

Expectation of
health center
participation in
DSRIP, as
members of PPS
arrangements.

Alternative
payment
method: general
approach

Health centers
continue to be
paid on an
encounter basis
for attributed
patients. The
goal is to achieve
90% of care tied
to value-based

PPS payment
reconciliation

Retained by
the state

Financial risk
mitigation under
base payment
method

Alternative
payment models
remain under
development,
with PPS
encounter rate
retained until
replaced.

Quality
improvement

treating patients
with respect and
courtesy
8) the provision of
timely
appointments,
care, and
information
There are also a
number of
measures on
hospital quality
and patient
experience.
1) Reduced
spending on
inpatient and
emergency
department care,
2) PPS-set quality
metrics under state
policy, with
ongoing data

Governance

Health center
participation in
PPS
governance,
per governing
structure
chosen by PPS
entities under

21

New York State Department of Health. (April 2015). Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Official Documents.
https://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/dsrip/cms_official_docs.htm
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State

General description

Health center
participation

hospitals, with one health
center—led initiative.22
Oregon

Part of the state’s
Coordinated Care
Organization (CCO)
initiative,23 aimed at
developing integrated
delivery models. Eleven
health centers and rural
health clinics participate in
a 3-year alternative
payment system pilot
within the CCO initiative.24

Alternative
payment
method: general
approach

PPS payment
reconciliation

Financial risk
mitigation under
base payment
method

payment by
2019.
Health centers
elect to
participate in
pilot alternative
payment model.

Per-member-permonth payment
for patients
attributed to the
health center,
using an 18month look-back
period to
determine
attribution and
utilization,

Retained by
the state

Per-member-permonth payment
is tied to actual
health center
experience over
the preceding 18month time
period, with
adjustments for
changes in scope
of covered
services offered.
Health centers
also receive a
hold-harmless
payment

Quality
improvement

Governance

collection.

state policy

Tied to overall CCO
measures, with
data collection to
permit future
quality and accessenabling measures
tied directly to
alternative
payment.

Health centers
eligible to
participate in
CCO
governance,
but with
alternative
payment
methodology
the product of
direct
state/health
center
negotiations
rather than a
CCO/health

22

Goldberg, D. (September 28, 2015). Community-based groups have uncertain role in Medicaid reform.
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/albany/2015/09/8577329/community-based-groups-have-uncertain-role-medicaid-reform
23
Oregon Health Authority. (March 1, 2012). Application for Amendment and Renewal Oregon Health Plan Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program.
1115 Demonstration Project. (11-W-00160/10 & 21-W-0013/10). https://cco.health.oregon.gov/DraftDocuments/Documents/narrative.pdf.
24
http://www.medicaid.gov/State-resource-center/Medicaid-State-Plan-Amendments/Downloads/OR/OR-12-008-AtT.pdf.
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State

General description

Health center
participation

Alternative
payment
method: general
approach

PPS payment
reconciliation

Financial risk
mitigation under
base payment
method
adjusted to
reflect the actual
volume of
encounters in the
absence of
payment reform,
thereby enabling
a test of
alternative
reforms that may
reduce
encounters
without
diminishing
overall revenue.

25

Quality
improvement

Governance

center
negotiation.25

Personal communication, Oregon Primary Care Association. April 27, 2015
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